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A banking model in which partial suspension is best

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Author Info
Neil Wallace
Abstract

This paper establishes that partial suspension is an optimal arrangement in an aggregate-risk version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model. The model is a variant of Wallace (1988) in which aggregate risk about the fraction of agents who "want to" consume early is limited to a small group who show up last to possibly withdraw early. Partial suspension means that when they do withdraw early, members of this group get less than those who showed up first to withdraw early. Limiting the aggregate risk to a group who show up last is a simplifying assumption because it makes it impossible to draw inferences about the aggregate state from the actions of those who show up first.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its journal Quarterly Review.

Volume (Year): (1990)
Issue (Month): Fall ()
Pages: 11-23
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1990:i:fall:p:11-23:n:v.14no.4

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Related research
Keywords: Deposit insurance ; Bank failures;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. John H. Kareken, 1981. "Deregulating commercial banks: the watchword should be caution," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr / Sum. [Downloadable!]
  2. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Antoine Martin, 2001. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance : preventing bank panics without moral hazard?," Research Working Paper RWP 01-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Hoerova, Marie, 2005. "Financial Deepening and Bank Runs," Working Papers 05-07, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  6. repec:bep:mactop:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1052-1052 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2003. "Herd Behavior, Bank Runs and Information Disclosure," MPRA Paper 9513, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "On the Existence of Equilibrium Bank Runs in a Diamond-Dybvig Environment," Finance 0404009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2003. "Financial Intermediaries and Markets," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-44, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr. & Margarita Samartín, 2006. "Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?," Working Paper 2006-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2008. "Run equilibria in a model of financial intermediation," Staff Reports 312, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  13. Gu, Chao, 2007. "Herding and Bank Runs," Working Papers 07-15, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Marie Hoerova, 2007. "Run-prone banking and asset markets," Working Paper Series 845, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  15. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2003. "Financial Fragility, Liquidity and Asset Prices," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-37, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  16. Carmona, Guilherme & Leoni, Patrick, 2003. "Equilibrium Non-Panic Bank Failures," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp424, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
  17. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007. "Commitment and equilibrium bank runs," Staff Reports 274, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
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