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Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model of Financial Intermediation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Edward J. Green (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)
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In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf.~Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Meeting papers with number
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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 28 Jun 1995Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpme:9506001Note: INCOMPLETE AND PRELIMINARY 12 pages, LaTeX.Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Bryant, John, 1980.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Neil Wallace, 2006.
"The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model ,"
Working Paper
0615, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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Other versions: Hoerova, Marie, 2005.
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Working Papers
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Ted Temzelides, 1995.
"Evolution, Coordination, and Banking Panics ,"
Finance
9511002, EconWPA.
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Other versions:
Theodosios Temzelides, 1995.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Borys Grochulski, 2008.
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Economic Quarterly ,
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Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2008.
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Staff Reports
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[Downloadable!]
Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007.
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Working Paper
07-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007.
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David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal, 2006.
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Other versions: Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2003.
"Herd Behavior, Bank Runs and Information Disclosure ,"
MPRA Paper
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J. Martel & M. Mokrane, 2002.
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THEMA Working Papers
2002-21, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003.
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Levine's Bibliography
666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Other versions: David Backus & Silverio Foresi & Liuren Wu, 2002.
"Contagion in Financial Markets ,"
Finance
0207009, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Edward J. Green & Ping Lin, 2000.
"Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing? ,"
Quarterly Review ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 3-13.
[Downloadable!]
Guilherme Carmona, 2004.
"On the Existence of Equilibrium Bank Runs in a Diamond-Dybvig Environment ,"
Finance
0404009, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Ted Temzelides & Bernandino Adao, 1995.
"Beliefs, Competition, and Bank Runs ,"
Finance
9511001, EconWPA.
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Other versions:
Bernadino Adao & Theodosios Temzelides, 1995.
"Beliefs, competition, and bank runs ,"
Working Papers
95-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Bernardino Adao & Ted Temzelides, 1998.
"Sequential Equilibrium and Competition in a Diamond-Dybvig Banking Model ,"
Review of Economic Dynamics ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr. & Margarita Samartín, 2006.
"Why do banks promise to pay par on demand? ,"
Working Paper
2006-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Margarita Samartin & Gerald Dwyer, 2004.
"Why do Banks Promise to Pay Par on Demand? ,"
2004 Meeting Papers
180c, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Margarita SamartÃn & Gerald Dwyer, 2004.
"Why do banks promise to pay par on demand? ,"
2004 Meeting Papers
372, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Dwyer Jr., Gerald P. & Samartín, Margarita, 2009.
"Why do banks promise to pay par on demand? ,"
Journal of Financial Stability ,
Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-169, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Harald Uhlig, 2009.
"A Model of a Systemic Bank Run ,"
NBER Working Papers
15072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Marie Hoerova, 2007.
"Run-prone banking and asset markets ,"
Working Paper Series
845, European Central Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Carmona, Guilherme & Leoni, Patrick, 2003.
"Equilibrium Non-Panic Bank Failures ,"
FEUNL Working Paper Series
wp424, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
[Downloadable!]
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