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Over-the-Counter Markets

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  • Darrell Duffie
  • Nicolae Garleanu
  • Lasse Heje Pedersen

Abstract

We study how intermediation and asset prices in over-the-counter markets are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly the prices at which investors trade with each other as well as marketmakers' bid and ask prices in a dynamic model with strategic agents. Bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors, or have easier access to multiple marketmakers. With a monopolistic marketmaker, bid-ask spreads are higher if investors have easier access to the marketmaker. We characterize endogenous search and welfare, and discuss empirical implications.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10816.

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Date of creation: Oct 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10816

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