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Equilibrium and government commitment

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Author Info
Marco Bassetto

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Abstract

How should a government use the power to commit to ensure a desirable equilibrium outcome? In this paper, I show a misleading aspect of what has become a standard approach to this question, and I propose an alternative. I show that the complete description of an optimal (indeed, of any) policy scheme requires outlining the consequences of paths that are often neglected. The specification of policy along those paths is crucial in determining which schemes implement a unique equilibrium and which ones leave room for multiple equilibria that depend on the expectations of the private sector.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Working Papers with number 624.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:624

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-22, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alesina, Alberto F & Prati, Alessandro & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "Public Confidence and Debt Management: A Model and a Case Study of Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 351, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-61, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marco Bassetto, 2002. "A Game-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2167-2195, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John H. Cochrane, 2007. "Inflation Determination With Taylor Rules: A Critical Review," NBER Working Papers 13409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wouter J. DenHaan, 2002. "Temporary Shocks and Unavoidable Transistions to a High-Unemployment Regime," NBER Working Papers 9349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007. "Commitment and equilibrium bank runs," Staff Reports 274, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  4. Den Haan, Wouter, 2003. "Temporary Shocks and Unavoidable Transitions to a High-Unemployment Regime," CEPR Discussion Papers 3704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marco Bassetto, 2001. "A game-theoretic view of the fiscal theory of the price level," Working Papers 612, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Marco Bassetto & Jess Benhabib, 2006. "Redistribution, Taxes and the Median Voter," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 211-223, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Alexandre B. Cunha, 2006. "Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for the Study of Exchange Rate Regimes," IBMEC RJ Economics Discussion Papers 2006-03, Economics Research Group, IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro. [Downloadable!]
  8. Wouter J. den Haan, 2003. "Temporary shocks and unavoidable transitions to a high-unemployment regime," Working Paper Series 239, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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