Inefficient Provision of Liquidity
AbstractWe study an economy where the lack of a simultaneous double coincidence of wants creates the need for a relatively safe asset (money). We show that, even in the absence of asymmetric information or an agency problem, the private provision of liquidity is inefficient. The reason is that liquidity affects prices and the welfare of others, and creators do not internalize this. This distortion is present even if we introduce lending and government money. To eliminate the inefficiency the government must restrict the creation of liquidity by the private sector.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8525.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2011-08-22 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2011-08-22 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CBA-2011-08-22 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2011-08-22 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MIC-2011-08-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2011-08-22 (Monetary Economics)
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