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Oliver D. Hart

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Personal Details

First Name: Oliver
Middle Name: D.
Last Name: Hart
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RePEc Short-ID: pha222

Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Homepage: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/hart/hart.html
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Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Works

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Working papers

  1. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, 2014. "Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is," NBER Working Papers 20207, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Oliver D. Hart, 2013. "More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 19001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. T. Christopher Borek & Angelo Frattarelli & Oliver Hart, 2013. "Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine," NBER Working Papers 19081, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Oliver D. Hart & Luigi Zingales, 2013. "Liquidity and Inefficient Investment," NBER Working Papers 19184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Oliver D. Hart & Luigi Zingales, 2011. "Inefficient Provision of Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 17299, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Ernst Fehr & Oliver D. Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?," NBER Working Papers 17545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Oliver D. Hart, 2011. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," NBER Working Papers 16929, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Hart, Oliver & Zingales, Luigi, 2009. "A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Ernst Fehr & Oliver D. Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence," NBER Working Papers 14501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 2008. "A Theory of Firm Scope," NBER Working Papers 14613, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Oliver D. Hart, 2007. "Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 13481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Oliver Hart, 2007. "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points," NBER Working Papers 13540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2006. "Contracts as Reference Points," NBER Working Papers 12706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Simeon Djankov & Oliver Hart & Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "Debt Enforcement Around the World," NBER Working Papers 12807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," ESE Discussion Papers 109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  16. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," ESE Discussion Papers 114, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  17. Oliver Hart, 2002. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/061, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  18. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Hart, Oliver, 2001. "Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3073, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Norms and the Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 8286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, 2001. "Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 8633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," NBER Working Papers 8285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Oliver Hart, 2000. "Different Approaches to Bankruptcy," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1903, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  23. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1880, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  24. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 358, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  25. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1792, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  27. Oliver Hart & Rafael La Porta Drago & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & John Moore, 1997. "A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions," NBER Working Papers 6278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," NBER Working Papers 5744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," NBER Working Papers 4886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Philippe Aghion & Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1992. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Working Papers 4097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1990. "A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims," NBER Working Papers 3431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  33. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  34. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1989. "Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 192, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  35. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  36. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 174, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  37. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  38. Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Working papers 442, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  39. Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations," Working papers 441, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  40. Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Working papers 448, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  41. Oliver Hart & David Kreps, 1986. "Price Destabilizing Speculation (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (october 1986).)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1984/92, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  42. Oliver Hart, 1986. "Bargaining and Strikes," Working papers 423, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  43. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  44. Hart, Oliver D. & Kreps, David M., 1986. "Price Destabilizing Speculation," Scholarly Articles 3448679, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  45. Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  46. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 115, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  47. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  48. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, 1984. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986))," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 101, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  49. Oliver Hart, 1983. "Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 64, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  50. Oliver Hart, 1983. "Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 82, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  51. Oliver Hart, 1983. "Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 85, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  52. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart & Eric Maskin, 1982. "Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks," NBER Working Papers 0975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  53. Oliver Hart, 1982. "Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 44, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  54. Oliver Hart, 1982. "Reasonable Conjectures," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 61, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  55. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, 1978. "A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies," Special Studies Papers 115, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  56. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, 1978. "The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations," Special Studies Papers 113, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  57. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  58. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 23-79, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  59. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, . "The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 6-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  60. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 21-79, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.

Articles

  1. Oliver Hart, 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 437-456, August.
  2. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
  3. Oliver Hart, 2011. "Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(1), pages 101-13, March.
  4. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Scope," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(2), pages 483-513, May.
  5. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2009. "Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 561-572, 04-05.
  6. Oliver Hart, 2009. "Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 437-445, 05.
  7. Oliver Hart, 2009. "Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points-super-," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(1), pages 267-300, February.
  8. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48, 02.
  9. Simeon Djankov & Oliver Hart & Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Debt Enforcement around the World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1105-1149, December.
  10. Oliver Hart, 2008. "Economica Coase Lecture Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 404-411, 08.
  11. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 182-186, May.
  12. Oliver Hart, 2006. "Different approaches to bankruptcy," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(1), pages 3-8, 04.
  13. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2005. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 675-702, August.
  14. Oliver Hart, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C69-C76, March.
  15. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1079-1100, December.
  16. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 115-38, January.
  17. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41, February.
  18. Hart, Oliver & La Porta Drago, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Moore, John, 1997. "A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 461-473, April.
  19. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
  20. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1996. "The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 53-69, Winter.
  21. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1995. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 567-85, June.
  22. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-89, May.
  23. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 841-79, November.
  24. Aghion, Philippe & Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1992. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 523-46, October.
  25. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  26. Hart, Oliver, 1989. "Bargaining and Strikes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 25-43, February.
  27. Oliver D. Hart, 1988. "Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 467-76, August.
  28. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
  29. Hart, Oliver D, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 119-39, Spring.
  30. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October.
  31. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
  32. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
  33. Hart, Oliver D & Kreps, David M, 1986. "Price Destabilizing Speculation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 927-52, October.
  34. Hart, Oliver D, 1985. "Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 529-46, October.
  35. Hart, Oliver D, 1985. "Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380), pages 889-908, December.
  36. Guesnerie, Roger & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 525-45, October.
  37. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D & Maskin, Eric S, 1983. "Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 907-28, December.
  38. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 123-56, Supplemen.
  39. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
  40. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
  41. Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35, January.
  42. Hart, Oliver, 1982. "A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 109-38, February.
  43. Hart, Oliver D, 1982. "Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities: A Correction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 313-14, April.
  44. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-07, May.
  45. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 253-70, May.
  46. Hart, Oliver D., 1980. "Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 279-312, April.
  47. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
  48. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. " Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-34, May.
  49. Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1057-83, September.
  50. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 293-329, March.
  51. Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 1-30, January.
  52. Hart, Oliver D, 1977. "On the Profitability of Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 91(4), pages 579-97, November.
  53. Hart, Oliver D., 1977. "Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 53-83, October.
  54. Hart, Oliver D. & Kuhn, Harold W., 1975. "A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 335-343, December.
  55. Hart, Oliver D, 1975. "Some Negative Results on the Existence of Comparative Statics Results in Portfolio Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 615-21, October.
  56. Hart, Oliver D., 1975. "On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 418-443, December.
  57. Hart, Oliver D., 1974. "On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 293-311, November.
  58. Hart, Oliver D & Jaffee, Dwight M, 1974. "On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 129-47, January.

Chapters

  1. Philippe Aghion & Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, 1994. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring, pages 215-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1982. "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 107-140 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Books

  1. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, September.
  2. Partha Dasgupta & Douglas Gale & Oliver Hart & Eric Maskin (ed.), 1992. "Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262541599, December.

NEP Fields

31 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (1) 2013-06-04
  2. NEP-BAN: Banking (5) 2009-06-17 2010-01-16 2011-08-22 2011-08-29 2014-06-22. Author is listed
  3. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (9) 2007-09-24 2007-10-13 2007-10-27 2009-01-10 2009-06-17 2010-01-16 2011-04-16 2011-08-22 2011-08-29. Author is listed
  4. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (2) 2011-08-22 2011-08-29
  5. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (4) 2007-09-24 2009-01-03 2011-11-14 2011-11-21
  6. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 1998-09-14 1999-11-15 2003-11-03
  7. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (4) 2000-11-29 2001-06-08 2001-06-08 2014-06-22
  8. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2007-10-13 2013-05-05
  9. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (5) 2008-11-25 2009-01-03 2009-01-10 2011-04-16 2013-05-05. Author is listed
  10. NEP-DEV: Development (1) 2004-03-22
  11. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (6) 2007-10-27 2008-11-25 2009-01-03 2011-11-07 2011-11-14 2011-11-21. Author is listed
  12. NEP-FIN: Finance (4) 1999-11-08 2000-11-29 2001-06-08 2001-06-08
  13. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2005-01-02 2011-11-07
  14. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (2) 2013-07-05 2013-09-28
  15. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 1999-11-15
  16. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (2) 1999-11-08 2011-11-21
  17. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (6) 2000-11-29 2007-01-13 2007-10-13 2007-10-27 2008-11-25 2009-01-03. Author is listed
  18. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (5) 2011-08-22 2011-08-29 2013-07-05 2013-09-28 2014-06-22. Author is listed
  19. NEP-MFD: Microfinance (1) 2003-11-03
  20. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (11) 1998-09-14 1999-11-08 2001-12-14 2009-01-10 2011-08-22 2011-11-07 2011-11-14 2013-05-05 2013-07-05 2013-09-28 2014-06-22. Author is listed
  21. NEP-MON: Monetary Economics (2) 2011-08-22 2011-08-29
  22. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2013-06-04 2013-07-05
  23. NEP-PKE: Post Keynesian Economics (4) 1998-09-14 1999-11-15 2001-06-08 2001-06-08
  24. NEP-REG: Regulation (3) 2004-06-07 2009-06-17 2010-01-16
  25. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2009-06-17 2010-01-16
  26. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (2) 2006-11-25 2007-09-24

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