Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

The cheapest way for banks to finance long term illiquid projects is typically to borrow short term from households. But when household needs for funds are high, interest rates will rise sharply, debtors will have to shut down illiquid projects, and in extremis, will face more damaging runs. Authorities may want to push down interest rates to maintain economic activity in the face of such illiquidity, but intervention may not always be feasible, and when feasible, could encourage banks to increase leverage or fund even more illiquid projects up front. This could make all parties worse off. Authorities may want to commit to a specific policy of interest rate intervention to restore appropriate incentives. For instance, to offset incentives for banks to make more illiquid loans, authorities may have to commit to raising rates when low, to counter the distortions created by lowering them when high. We draw implications for interest rate policy to combat illiquidity.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15197.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15197.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15197

Note: CF ME
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
• E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
• E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
• E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
• E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
• G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
• G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
• G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2009-08-02 (All new papers)
• NEP-CBA-2009-08-02 (Central Banking)
• NEP-MAC-2009-08-02 (Macroeconomics)
• NEP-MON-2009-08-02 (Monetary Economics)

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2008. "Financial intermediaries, financial stability, and monetary policy," Staff Reports 346, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
2. Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2010. "Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy," Economics Working Papers 1202, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
   
   • Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2011. "Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(8), pages 2656-2692.
   • Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2010. "Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets and Monetary Policy," Working Papers 429, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
   • Freixas, X. & Martin, A. & Skeie, D., 2010. "Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy," Discussion Paper 2010-35S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2009. "Bank liquidity, interbank markets, and monetary policy," Staff Reports 371, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
3. Hellwig, Martin, 1994. "Liquidity provision, banking, and the allocation of interest rate risk," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 1363-1389, August.
4. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 15138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 60-93, February.
   • Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," IDEI Working Papers 571, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Oct 2010.
   • Jean Tirole & Emmanuel Farhi, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," Working Papers 2009.57, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
   • Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
   • Jean Tirole & Emmanuel Farhi, 2010. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," 2010 Meeting Papers 822, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," TSE Working Papers 09-052, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2010.
5. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram Rajan, 2009. "The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Remedies," NBER Working Papers 14739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Remedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 606-10, May.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15197

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal