Two Monetary Tools: Interest-Rates and Haircuts
AbstractWe study a production economy with multiple sectors financed by issuing securities to agents who face capital constraints. Binding capital constraints propagate business cycles, and a reduction of the interest rate can increase the required return of high-haircut assets since it can increase the shadow cost of capital for constrained agents. The required return can be lowered by easing funding constraints through lowering haircuts. To assess empirically the power of the haircut tool, we study the natural experiment of the introduction of the legacy Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). We estimate that the TALF program reduced required returns by more than 0.70% using a triple difference-in-difference regression. Further, unique survey evidence suggests the effect could be more than 3% and provides broader evidence on the demand sensitivity to haircuts.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2010 Meeting Papers with number 1102.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Ashcraft, Adam & Garleanu, Nicolae Bogdan & Pedersen, Lasse Heje, 2010. "Two Monetary Tools: Interest Rates and Haircuts," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8000, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Adam Ashcraft & Nicolae Gârleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2010. "Two Monetary Tools: Interest Rates and Haircuts," NBER Working Papers 16337, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daniele Coen-Pirani, 2000.
"Margin Requirements and Equilibrium Asset Prices,"
GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business
2001-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
- Darrell Duffie & Nicolae Garleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2005.
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1815-1847, November.
- Tobias Adrian & Emanuel Moench & Hyun Song Shin, 2010.
"Financial intermediation, asset prices, and macroeconomic dynamics,"
422, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Hyun Song Shin & Emanuel Moench & Tobias Adrian, 2010. "Financial Intermediation, Asset Prices, and Macroeconomic Dynamics," 2010 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 297, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2000.
"Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: A model of the credit channel,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1931-1950, December.
- Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 1999. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2060, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Repullo,R. & Suarez,J., 1996. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros- 9604, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 1999. "Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 129, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Vasco CÃºrdia & Michael Woodford, 2008.
"Credit frictions and optimal monetary policy,"
Working Paper Research, National Bank of Belgium
146, National Bank of Belgium.
- Vasco CÃºrdia & Michael Woodford, 2009. "Credit frictions and optimal monetary policy," BIS Working Papers 278, Bank for International Settlements.
- Vasco Curdia & Michael Woodford, 2008. "Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0809-02, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.