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"Principal - Agent" Problem In The Context Of The Economic Survival

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Author Info
Jiří Hlaváček- Michal Hlaváček

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Abstract

This paper analyses problems within the asymmetric information models (principal agent models) where we replace standard assumption of maximisation of expected income by maximisation of probability of economic survival. This paper concentrates on two basic models - adverse selection model and moral hazard model. In both cases the effect of asymmetry of information gets weaker or even disappears. Contrary to standard approach the competitive Pareto effective equilibrium could exists in both models with pooled contract with full coverage of possible accident by the principal.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Acta Oeconomica Pragensia.

Volume (Year): 2006 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 18-33
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Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2006:y:2006:i:3:id:81:p:18-33

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Related research
Keywords: moral hazard; adverse selection; probability of survival; Pareto distribution;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

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