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What Drives the Optimal Bankruptcy Law Design? (in English)

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Author Info
Ondřej Knot () (CERGE-EI, Prague, and Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague)
Ondřej Vychodil () (CERGE-EI, Prague, and Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague)

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Abstract

In this paper the authors discuss the factors that interact in the design of an optimal bankruptcy law. The authors focus on issues that are often overlooked in both the policy debate and in the academic research on bankruptcy. After answering the question why a bankruptcy law is needed at all, the authors discuss the criteria of ex ante vs. ex post efficiency. The second factor the authors deal with is institutional quality, namely the quality of the judiciary. They argue that, considering factors such as imprudence and corruption, it may be optimal to resign on the first-best solution that could be theoretically achievable with a benevolent and omniscient judiciary. The optimal bankruptcy law would then contain more simple and automatic rules and less space for judicial (i.e., individual) discretion. The authors´ concluding comment concerns the lack of empirical research in the bankruptcy area in the Czech Republic and the essential need for such research.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences in its journal Finance a uver - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 55 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Pages: 110-123
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Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:55:y:2005:i:3-4:p:110-123

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Related research
Keywords: bankruptcy; capital and ownership structure; ex-ante and ex-post efficiency; moral hazard; judicial corruption;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Oliver Hart, 2000. "Different Approaches to Bankruptcy," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1903, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Biais, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas, 2008. "Credit, Wages and Bankruptcy Laws," IDEI Working Papers 289, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Sonin, Konstantin & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2000. "Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Evidence from Russia," CEPR Discussion Papers 2488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN & Erik BERGLÖF & Gérard ROLAND, 2003. "Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
  6. Aghion, Philippe & Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1992. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 523-46, October.
    Other versions:
  7. Berkovitch, Elazar & Israel, Ronen, 1999. "Optimal Bankruptcy Laws across Different Economic Systems," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 347-77.
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