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Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information

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Schmidt-Mohr, Udo
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3SX0PJT-4/2/dbc2631c40a43de7b8f6f53445896918
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 41 (1997)
Issue (Month): 7 (July)
Pages: 1321-1342
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:41:y:1997:i:7:p:1321-1342

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  1. Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  2. Naoki Kojima, 2009. "Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 175-187, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Robert Buckley & Gulmira Karaguishiyeva & Robert Order & Laura Vecvagare, 2006. "Mortgage credit risk in EU countries: Constraints on exploiting the single currency market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 13-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Karel Janda, 2004. "Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers IES 61, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
  5. Buckley, Robert & Karaguishiyeva, Gulmira & Van Order, Robert & Vecvagare, Laura, 2003. "Comparing mortgage credit risk policies : an options-based approach," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3047, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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