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A puha költségvetési korlát - II
[The soft budget constraint II]

Author

Listed:
  • Kornai, János
  • Maskin, Eric
  • Roland, Gérard

Abstract

A tanulmány javaslatot tesz a puha költségvetési korlát fogalmának tisztázására. A fogalmat széles körben alkalmazzák mind a szocialista és posztszocialista, mind pedig a piaci gazdaságok elemzése során. A szerzők által megfogalmazott értelmezés felöleli a puha költségvetési korlát jelenségcsoportjával kapcsolatos megközelítések zömét, és egyben osztályozza az okokat és a következményeket (I. rész). Ezen az értelmezésen alapul a témáról szóló elméleti irodalom áttekintése, valamint összevetése a dinamikus elkötelezettség problematikájával foglalkozó más közgazdasági irodalommal (II. rész).* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: P10, P20, P30, P40, G20, G30, H60, H70.

Suggested Citation

  • Kornai, János & Maskin, Eric & Roland, Gérard, 2022. "A puha költségvetési korlát - II [The soft budget constraint II]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 94-132.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:2026
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2022.1.94
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    1. Hámori, Balázs, 2012. "Kornai János válogatott művei sorozat a pozsonyi Kalligram kiadásában [The series of selected works of János Kornai published by Kalligram of Bratislava]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 220-228.
    2. Kornai, János, 2010. "Hiánygazdaság - többletgazdaság. Tanulmány a piac elméletéről - II. rész [Shortage economy - surplus economy. A study on market theory II]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1021-1044.
    3. Havran, Zsolt & András, Krisztina, 2022. "A puha költségvetési korlát szindrómája a hivatásos labdarúgásban. Kitekintés a nemzetközi és a magyarországi sajátosságokra [The soft-budget constraint in professional football syndrome. A view of," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 230-254.
    4. Kornai, János, 2008. "A puha költségvetési korlát szindrómája a kórházi szektorban [The soft budget constraint syndrome in the hospital sector]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1037-1056.
    5. Fertő, Imre & Bakucs, Lajos Zoltán & Fogarasi, József, 2007. "A puha költségvetési korlát és a hitelpiaci tökéletlenségek hatása a beruházásokra a magyar mezőgazdaságban [The effect of soft budget constraint and credit-market imperfections on investments in H," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 322-333.
    6. Kornai, János, 2014. "Bevezetés A puha költségvetési korlát című kötethez [Introduction to the author s volume entitled Soft Budget Constraint]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 845-897.
    7. Kornai, János, 2022. "Innováció és dinamizmus. Kölcsönhatás a rendszerek és a technikai haladás között [Innovation and dynamism. The reciprocal effect between systems and technical advance]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 133-173.
    8. Győrffy, Dóra, 2014. "Válság és válságkezelés Görögországban. A puha költségvetési korlát szerepe a gazdasági összeomlásban [Crisis and crisis management in Greece. The role of soft budget constraints in the economic co," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 27-52.
    9. Kerényi, Ádám, 2018. ""Kornai-láz" a Közgázon. Beszámoló a Kornai János 90. születésnapja alkalmából szervezett eseménysorozatról, 2018. január-február ["Kornai fever" at the Economics University. Re," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 667-676.
    10. Csóka, Péter, 2018. "Az adósságelengedés modellezése kooperatív játékelmélettel [Modelling debt relief using cooperative game theory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 768-779.
    11. Kornai, János, 2012. "Mit mond A hiány és A szocialista rendszer a mai magyar olvasónak?. Bevezető tanulmány az életműsorozat első két kötetéhez [What Economics of Shortage and The Socialist System have to say to presen," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 426-443.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P10 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - General
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P40 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - General
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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