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Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation

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  • Kolecek, Ludek

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information, where the creditor cannot credibly commit to liquidate the firm if the default occurs. In our setting we consider a bankruptcy law to be a one-dimensional variable that influences creditor's expectation value of collateral. We find that there is an interval of the bankruptcy law, where the number of liquidations decreases in the toughness of the bankruptcy law. We also find that if the liquidation costs are high, softer bankruptcy law is preferred.

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  • Kolecek, Ludek, 2008. "Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 40-61, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:40-61
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    2. Blazy, Régis & Deffains, Bruno & Umbhauer, Gisèle & Weill, Laurent, 2013. "Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 129-144.
    3. Louzis, Dimitrios P. & Vouldis, Angelos T. & Metaxas, Vasilios L., 2012. "Macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, business and consumer loan portfolios," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1012-1027.
    4. Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Guarantees and Subsidies when Lender has a Market Power," Working Papers IES 2011/18, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2011.

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