During last two decades we observe a boom of power indices literature related to constitutional analysis of European Union institutions and distribution of intra-institutional and inter-institutional influence in the European Union decision making. Growing interest to power indices methodology leads also to reconsideration of the methodology itself. In this paper a new general a priori voting power measure is proposed distinguishing between absolute and relative power. This power measure covers traditional Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf power indices as its special cases.
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Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.
František Turnovec, 2005.
"New Measure of Voting Power,"
Working Papers IES
69, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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