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National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making

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Author Info
František Turnovec () (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

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Abstract

The distribution of decisional power among member states of the EU has remained a hot issue in recent discussions about the future design of European Union decision making and the Lisbon revision of the unsuccessful proposal of the Constitutional Treaty. Usually only the distribution of voting weights in the Council of Ministers under the qualified majority voting rule is taken into account. In contrast, in this paper we formulate simplified models of the consultation and co-decision procedures in the decision making of European Union institutions, reflecting the fact that together with the Council of Ministers the Commission and European Parliament are also important actors in EU decision making. The main conclusion of this paper is that the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers voting record provides incomplete evidence about national influences in European Union decision making. With rare exceptions decision making is based on the consultation and co-decision procedures involvi ng the Commission and/or European Parliament. Legislative procedures change the inter-institutional distribution of power (among the Council, Commission and European Parliament) reducing the power of the Council and at the same time they change intra-institutional power in the Council (the relative power of the Member States compared to the Council voting without taking into account the Commission and Parliament).

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 2 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 154-173
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Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2008_154

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Related research
Keywords: Co-decision procedure; committee system; consultation procedure; European Union decision making; Penrose-Banzhaf power indices; qualified majority; simple voting committee; weighted majority game;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Leech, Dennis & Aziz, Haris, 2007. "The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union : an Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 824, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Laruelle, Annick & Widgrén, Mika, 1997. "The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament," CEPR Discussion Papers 1600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bindseil, Ulrich & Hantke, Cordula, 1997. "The power distribution in decision making among EU member states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 171-185, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgren, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Madeleine O. Hosli, 2008. "Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 076-096, March. [Downloadable!]
  6. František Turnovec, 1996. "Weights And Votes In European Union: Extension And Institutional Reform," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 1996(2). [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Madeleine O. Hosli & Moshé Machover, 2004. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council: A Reply to Moberg (2002)," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(3), pages 497-521, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2004. "Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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