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Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design

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Author Info
Madeleine O. Hosli () (Department of Political Science, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands)
Abstract

In the recent past, the choice of adequate voting weights and decision rules for the Council of the European Union (EU) has been a highly contested issue in EU intergovernmental negotiations. In general terms, the selection of a threshold for qualified majority votes (QMV) in the Council constitutes a trade-off in terms of decreased sovereignty for individual governments versus an increased collective ‘capacity to act’. This paper compares the effects of the proposal tabled by the Convention on the Future of Europe with the Nice Treaty provisions and the Lisbon Treaty, in terms of both the efficiency of decision-making and the distribution of relative voting power within the EU of twenty-seven member states. In addition, the paper shows how with the current size of EU membership, the EU risks being unable to reach intergovernmental agreement. Accordingly, a challenging issue for the future of the EU is to move towards reasonable provisions that allow its own constitution – if ever adopted – to get amended.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 2 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 076-096
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Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2008_076

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Related research
Keywords: Council of the European Union; decision rules; constitutional design; capacity to act; power indices;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Hosli, Madeleine O, 1993. "Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 47(4), pages 629-43, Autumn.
  2. Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgrén, Mika, 2000. "EU Reforms for Tomorrow’s Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2623, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Axel Moberg, 2002. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2), pages 259-282, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hosli, Madeleine O., 1993. "Admission of European Free Trade Association states to the European Community: effects on voting power in the European Community Council of Ministers," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(04), pages 629-643, September. [Downloadable!]
  6. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. " Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. František Turnovec, 2008. "National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 154-173, September. [Downloadable!]
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