This paper examines different ways of measuring power and the use of these measures in the context of the European Union. The paper deals with classical power indices of co-operative games and more recent non-cooperative a priori measures. Special emphasis of the paper is in inter-institutional balance of power, Nice reforms and eastern enlargement.
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Length: 37 pages Date of creation: 2003 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:eeg:euroeg:23
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