Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Fairness and squareness: fair decision making rules in the eu council?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Frantisek Turnovec

    ()
    (IES Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the following problem: assuming that the distribution of voting weights in a simple voting committee is fair (whatever this means), how should we set up a voting rule to guarantee that the distribution of influence (relative voting power) is as close as possible to relative voting weights.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ioz.pwr.wroc.pl/boid/artykuly/4-2009/art-7-turnovec.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management in its journal Operations Research and Decisions.

Volume (Year): 4 (2009)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 110-124

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:4:y:2009:p:110-124

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.ioz.pwr.wroc.pl/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: fairness; indirect voting power; Penrose–Banzhaf power index; optimal quota; Shapley–Shubik power index; simple voting committee; square root rule;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover & William Zwicker, 1998. "The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 83-116, January.
  2. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. " Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-39, March.
  3. František Turnovec, 2005. "New Measure of Voting Power," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies 69, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  4. Madeleine O. Hosli, 2008. "Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 076-096, March.
  5. Leech, Dennis & Aziz, Haris, 2007. "The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union : an Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 824, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Di Giannatale, Paolo & Passarelli, Francesco, 2012. "Voting chances instead of voting weights," MPRA Paper 43059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Matthias Weber, 2014. "Solving the Inverse Power Problem in Two-Tier Voting Settings," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-019/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. František Turnovec, 2012. "Quota Manipulation and Fair Voting Rules in Committees," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies 2012/08, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Mar 2012.
  4. Frantisek Turnovec, 2011. "Quota Manipulation And Fair Voting Rules In Committees," EcoMod2011 3186, EcoMod.
  5. Matthias Weber, 2014. "Choosing Voting Systems behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-042/I, Tinbergen Institute.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:4:y:2009:p:110-124. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Piotr Wawrzynowski).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.