Quota Manipulation and Fair Voting Rules in Committees
AbstractThe concept of fairness is being discussed related to the distribution of voting power among different actors of voting. We are using the following, intuitively natural principle of fairness: each unit of resources (shares, seats) should yield the same voting power (influence). Voting power is not directly observable: as a proxy for it voting weights are used. Therefore, fairness is usually defined in terms of voting weights (e.g. voting weights are proportional to the results of an election). Assuming that a principle of fair distribution of voting weights is selected, we are addressing the question of how to achieve equality of relative voting power (at least approximately) to relative voting weights.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number 2012/08.
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision: Mar 2012
Fairness; optimal quota; simple weighted committee; strict proportional power; voting and power indices.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-04-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2012-04-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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