The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament
AbstractProbabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. We propose a probabilistic reduced extensive form voting game. By subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for example, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1600.
Date of creation: Mar 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Yener Kandogan, 2005. "Power analysis of the Nice Treaty on the future of European integration," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1147-1156.
- František Turnovec, 2008. "National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 154-173, September.
- Yener Kandogan, 2003. "DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-576, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.