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Teorie her, formování koalic a koncentrace politické moci v zastupitelstvu hlavního města Prahy
[Game Theory, Coalition Formation and Political Power Concentration in the Prague City Assembly]

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Dlouhý

Abstract

The objective of the paper is to study the political development in the Prague City Assembly after three elections in 2006, 2010, and 2014. The theory of voting games, the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indexes, and theories of coalition formation are used for an analysis of possible majority coalitions. We developed the mayor's power index that measures the probability that the party will be the strongest party in the majority coalition with the right having a mayor. Measures of concentration of political power are used for evaluating the processes of political fragmentation. The increased number of political parties represented in the Prague City Assembly highly increased the number of possible coalitions and the number of political parties needed to form majority coalitions. The process of political fragmentation is probably not limited only to the Prague City Assembly.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Dlouhý, 2016. "Teorie her, formování koalic a koncentrace politické moci v zastupitelstvu hlavního města Prahy [Game Theory, Coalition Formation and Political Power Concentration in the Prague City Assembly]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2016(6), pages 747-761.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2016:y:2016:i:6:id:1107:p:747-761
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2005. "Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 485-506, December.
    3. František Turnovec, 2007. "New Measure of Voting Power," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 04-14, March.
    4. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151, Elsevier.
    5. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; coalition formation; Shapley-Shubik power index; mayor's power index; Prague City Assembly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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