Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralisation: The Case of Russia
AbstractIn a centralized federation, where tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal govern-ment, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities because of a variety of reasons. These range from tax competition to principal-agent problems, state capture and benefits of fiscal equalisation. In this paper we discuss strategic tax auditing and collection from the perspective of fiscal federalism and test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federa-tion. Russia?s regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspect of tax auditing ma-nipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federation. We find partial evidence in favour of both of these hypotheses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2007-09.
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
fiscal federalism; tax arrears; transition economies;
Other versions of this item:
- Alexander Libman & Lars P. Feld, 2013. "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(4), pages 449-482, November.
- Lars P. Feld & Alexander Libman, 2007. "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralisation: The Case of Russia," CESifo Working Paper Series 2031, CESifo Group Munich.
- Alexander Libman & Lars P. Feld, 2009. "Strategic tax collection and fiscal decentralization: the case of Russia," Working Papers 2009/11, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2007-06-11 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2007-06-11 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2007-06-11 (Public Finance)
- NEP-TRA-2007-06-11 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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w0003, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
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- Libman, Alexander, 2010.
"Constitutions, regulations, and taxes: Contradictions of different aspects of decentralization,"
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 395-418, December.
- Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization," MPRA Paper 15854, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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"Market Access and the Evolution of within Plant Productivity in Chile,"
Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine
123456789/6913, Paris Dauphine University.
- Maria Bas & Ivan Ledezma, 2007. "Market Access and the Evolution of within Plant Productivity in Chile," CESifo Working Paper Series 2077, CESifo Group Munich.
- Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
- Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Endogenous (De)Centralization and the Russian Federalism," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 9(1), pages 23-57.
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- Bönke, Timm & Jochimsen, Beate & Schröder, Carsten, 2011. "Fiscal equalization and regions' (un)willingness-to-tax: Evidence from Germany," Economics Working Papers 2011,06, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
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