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Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?

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  • Alejandro Esteller-Moré

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Abstract

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power at the regional level. Firstly, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an “income effect” which disincentivises the efforts of the regional tax administration. Secondly, these efforts tend to be lower in those electoral districts where vote turnout is high, the margin to lose a parliamentary seat is narrow and their parliamentary representation is high, although the importance of these disincentives decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent. Finally, leftist governments, through the tax administration, tend to exert a greater effort in ensuring tax compliance. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-005-2651-5
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 12 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 639-663

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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:12:y:2005:i:5:p:639-663

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

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Keywords: tax administration; political economy;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bönke, Timm & Jochimsen, Beate & Schröder, Carsten, 2011. "Fiscal equalization and regions' (un)willingness-to-tax: Evidence from Germany," Economics Working Papers 2011,06, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  2. Friedrich G. Schneider & Benno Torgler, 2006. "What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from multicultural european countries," Economics working papers 2006-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  3. Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2011. "Is the tax administration just a money machine? Empirical evidence on redistributive politics," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 275-299, September.
  4. Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2005. "Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(5), pages 639-663, September.
  5. Timm Bönke & Beate Jochimsen & Carsten Schröder, 2013. "Fiscal Federalism and Tax Administration: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1307, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  6. Stijn Goeminne & Benny Geys & Carine Smolders, 2008. "Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 297-315, June.
  7. Luca Salvadori & José María Durán-Cabré & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2012. "Regional Competition On Tax Administration," ERSA conference papers ersa12p184, European Regional Science Association.

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