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The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency

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Author Info
Slemrod, Joel
Yitzhaki, Shlomo

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Abstract

The condition that characterizes the optimal size of a tax-collection agency is der ived and then given a simple interpretation in terms of excess burden This paper clarifies an earlier finding of A. Sandmo (1981) which s uggests that the optimal degree of enforcement is higher than a simpl e cost-benefit calculation would indicate. The appropriate condition is that, at the margin, the resource cost of increasing enforcement s hould equal the saving of excess burden due to the decline in exposur e to risk. The increased revenue gained from stricter enforcement doe s not enter the expression because it merely represents a transfer am ong the economy's identical agents. Copyright 1987 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 89 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 183-92
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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:89:y:1987:i:2:p:183-92

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982. "Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation," NBER Working Papers 0694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Christiansen, Vidar, 1980. "Two Comments on Tax Evasion," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 389-93, June.
  4. Christiansen, Vidar, 1980. "Two comments on tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 389-393, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Weiss, Laurence, 1976. "The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1343-52, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel Slemrod, 1988. "Randomness in Tax Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 2512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-07, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nipon Poapongsakorn & Kovit Charnvitayapong & Duangmanee Laovakul & Somchai Suksiriserekul & Bev Dahlby, 2000. "A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Thailand Taxpayer Survey," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 63-82, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1994. "Analyzing the standard deduction as a presumptive tax," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 25-34, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ira N. Gang & Arindam Das-Gupta, 1998. "Value Added Tax Evasion, Auditing and Transactions Matching," Departmental Working Papers 199607, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Don Fullerton & Marios Karayannis, 1993. "Tax Evasion and the Allocation of Capital," NBER Working Papers 4581, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Joel Slemrod, 1991. "Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems," NBER Working Papers 3038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Louis Kaplow, 1996. "How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of The Income Tax," NBER Working Papers 5391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gideon Yaniv, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering, and Optimal Deterrence Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 27-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Levin Mark & Movshovich Solomon, 2001. "Tax Evasion Modeling under Penalties and Refusal of Banks to Grant Loan," EERC Working Paper Series 99-306e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
  11. גדעון יניב, 1995. "העלמת הכנסות והלבנת הכנסות: ניתוח תיאורטי (באנגלית)," Working Papers 347, National Insurance Institute of Israel. [Downloadable!]
  12. Louis Kaplow, 1991. "Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion," NBER Working Papers 2996, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Sven Stö & Christian Traxler, 2005. "Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 515-531, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Pablo Serra, 1998. "El Sistema Impositivo y su Efecto en el Funcionamiento de la Economía: Una Revisión de la Literatura," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 39, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
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