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Tax Enforcement: A Public Choice Perspective

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  • Hunter, William J
  • Nelson, Michael A

Abstract

Federal income tax enforcement varies greatly across individual states. While it is not known if this interstate variation enhances efficiency, anecdotal evidence suggests it does not. In this paper, the authors apply the model of B. R. Weingast and M. Moran (1983) to the treasury and explore the relationship between the legislature and the IRS. Specifically, they model IRS audit rates by state as a function of both political and efficiency considerations. The authors find that the interstate difference in enforcement is influenced by efficiency considerations but also the IRS shifts enforcement away from states represented by legislators who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for the IRS. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 82 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
Pages: 53-67

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:82:y:1995:i:1-2:p:53-67

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Cited by:
  1. Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2005. "Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(5), pages 639-663, September.
  2. Alejandro Esteller-More, 2003. "The Politics of Tax Administration: Evidence from Spain," Public Economics 0303004, EconWPA.
  3. Stijn Goeminne & Benny Geys & Carine Smolders, 2008. "Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 297-315, June.
  4. Luca Barbone & Richard Bird & Jaime Vázquez Caro, 2012. "The Costs of VAT: A Review of the Literature," CASE Network Reports 0106, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  5. Daniel Sutter & Lee Coppock, 2003. "The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 107-118, June.
  6. Carlos Esteban Posada, 1998. "Los mercados de instituciones y las instituciones endogenas," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 48, pages 149-168, Enero Jun.

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