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Politician Careers and SEC enforcement against financial misconduct

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  • Mehta, Mihir N.
  • Zhao, Wanli

Abstract

We document that corporate financial misconduct has significant consequences for politicians' election outcomes and, in particular, those politicians that serve on U.S. congressional committees with SEC-relevant oversight responsibilities (“SEC-relevant politicians”). These politicians display a 31% greater likelihood of losing a reelection campaign after a local firm faces SEC enforcement for financial misconduct. We also document that SEC-relevant politicians appear to influence the SEC to limit career effects due to the potential consequences from enforcement against local firms. First, the timing of enforcement action announcements around SEC-relevant politicians' elections appears opportunistic. Second, firms in the districts of SEC-relevant politicians are less likely to receive SEC enforcement actions relative to other firms and, when faced with enforcement, receive smaller penalties. Collectively, these results suggest that politicians' career concerns impede the SEC's enforcement efforts.

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  • Mehta, Mihir N. & Zhao, Wanli, 2020. "Politician Careers and SEC enforcement against financial misconduct," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:69:y:2020:i:2:s0165410120300045
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101302
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    2. Kaufhold, Ann-Katrin & Langenbucher, Katja & Blank, Patrick & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2021. "BaFin (in)dependence - a reform proposal," SAFE White Paper Series 82, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. Karol Marek Klimczak & Alejo José G. Sison & Maria Prats & Maximilian B. Torres, 2022. "How to Deter Financial Misconduct if Crime Pays?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 205-222, August.
    4. Godsell, David & Huang, Kelly & Lao, Brent, 2023. "Managers’ rank & file employee coordination costs and real activities manipulation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    5. Matthew McCarten & Ivan Diaz‐Rainey & Helen Roberts & Eric K. M. Tan, 2022. "Political connections, tacit power and corporate misconduct," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(9-10), pages 1530-1552, October.
    6. Yue, Heng & Zhang, Liandong & Zhong, Qinlin, 2022. "The politics of bank opacity," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2).
    7. Hutton, Amy & Shu, Susan & Zheng, Xin, 2022. "Regulatory transparency and the alignment of private and public enforcement: Evidence from the public disclosure of SEC comment letters," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 297-321.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; Corporate governance; Securities and exchange commission; Senate committee on banking; housing; and urban affairs; House committee on financial services; AAER;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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