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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

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  • CHRISTOPHER S. ARMSTRONG
  • ALAN D. JAGOLINZER
  • DAVID F. LARCKER
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    Abstract

    ABSTRACT This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives. Copyright (c), University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2009.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Accounting Research.

    Volume (Year): 48 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (05)
    Pages: 225-271

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:48:y:2010:i:2:p:225-271

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    Cited by:
    1. Cheng, Mei & Dhaliwal, Dan & Zhang, Yuan, 2013. "Does investment efficiency improve after the disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-18.
    2. Thomas Jeanjean & Hervé Stolowy & Michael Erkens, 2012. "Economic consequences of adopting English for annual reports," Post-Print hal-00690931, HAL.
    3. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Ittner, Christopher D. & Larcker, David F., 2010. "Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels," Research Papers 2068, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    4. Jordan, Bradford D. & Liu, Mark H. & Wu, Qun, 2014. "Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 1-19.
    5. Kirk, Marcus, 2011. "Research for sale: Determinants and consequences of paid-for analyst research," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 182-200, April.
    6. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Larcker, David F. & Ormazabal, Gaizka & Taylor, Daniel J., 2013. "The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 327-350.
    7. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Larcker, David F. & Ormazabal, Gaizka & Taylor, Daniel J., 2012. "The Relation between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives," Research Papers 2120, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    8. McInnis, John & Collins, Daniel W., 2011. "The effect of cash flow forecasts on accrual quality and benchmark beating," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 219-239, April.
    9. Feng, Mei & Ge, Weili & Luo, Shuqing & Shevlin, Terry, 2011. "Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 21-36, February.
    10. Skaife, Hollis A. & Veenman, David & Wangerin, Daniel, 2013. "Internal control over financial reporting and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from the profitability of insider trading," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 91-110.
    11. Bugeja, Martin & Matolcsy, Zoltan P. & Spiropoulos, Helen, 2012. "Is there a gender gap in CEO compensation?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 849-859.
    12. Hanlon, Michelle & Heitzman, Shane, 2010. "A review of tax research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 127-178, December.
    13. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    14. Dichev, Ilia D. & Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R. & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2013. "Earnings quality: Evidence from the field," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 1-33.
    15. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2013. "Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance," Research Papers 2134, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    16. Bahram Soltani, 2014. "The Anatomy of Corporate Fraud: A Comparative Analysis of High Profile American and European Corporate Scandals," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 120(2), pages 251-274, March.
    17. Robert Davidson & Aiyesha Dey & Abbie J. Smith, 2012. "Executives' "Off-The-Job" Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk," NBER Working Papers 18001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Files, Rebecca, 2012. "SEC enforcement: Does forthright disclosure and cooperation really matter?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 353-374.
    19. Gabbioneta, Claudia & Greenwood, Royston & Mazzola, Pietro & Minoja, Mario, 2013. "The influence of the institutional context on corporate illegality," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 484-504.
    20. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    21. Stolowy, Hervé & Jeanjean, Thomas & Erkens, Michael, 2011. "The economic consequences of increasing the international visibility of financial reports," Les Cahiers de Recherche 957, HEC Paris.
    22. Kim, Jeong-Bon & Li, Yinghua & Zhang, Liandong, 2011. "CFOs versus CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 713-730, September.

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