Regional Competition On Tax Administration
AbstractThe tax auditing parameters have scarcely been analyzed by the literature as relevant policy-making instruments; however the enforcement strategies are crucial elements of the tax burden. In this paper we show that in a federal framework the tax auditing policies could represent additional tools on which regional institutions can interact between them. We investigate the presence of this interaction by means of a spatial econometric approach. We employ a time-space recursive model that accounts for sluggish adjustment in the auditing policies obtaining results congruent with standard theory and corroborating the presence of horizontal competition between regions on tax auditing policies. Moreover we find that once regional governments have legal power, the opaque competition on enforcement policies disappears and supposedly it switches to a more transparent competition on statutory tax parameters. Keywords: tax administration and auditing, fiscal competition, fiscal federalism JEL Classification: H71, H77, H83
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Regional Science Association in its series ERSA conference papers with number ersa12p184.
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria
Web page: http://www.ersa.org
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2012-10-13 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-IUE-2012-10-13 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-10-13 (Public Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gunther Maier).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.