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Constitutions, regulations, and taxes: Contradictions of different aspects of decentralization

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  • Libman, Alexander
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    Abstract

    The paper confronts different aspects of decentralization: fiscal decentralization, postconstitutional regulatory decentralization, and constitutional decentralization - using a single dataset from Russian Federation of the Yeltsin period as a politically asymmetric country and a variety of indicators. It finds no robust correlation between different decentralization aspects; moreover, three processes of devolution appearing in the same country at the same time seem to be driven by different (though partly overlapping) forces. Hence, a specific aspect of decentralization is hardly able to serve as a proxy for another one or for the overall decentralization process. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Frankfurt School of Finance and Management in its series Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series with number 138.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:138

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    Keywords: Regulatory decentralization; fiscal decentralization; determinants of decentralization;

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