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Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization

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Author Info
Libman, Alexander

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Abstract

The paper confronts different aspects of decentralization: fiscal decentralization, post-constitutional regulatory decentralization, and constitutional decentralization – using a single dataset from Russian Federation of the Yeltsin period as a politically asymmetric country. It finds virtually no correlation between different decentralization aspects; moreover, three processes of devolution appearing in the same country at the same time seem to be driven by different (though partly overlapping) forces. Hence, a specific aspect of decentralization is hardly able to serve as a proxy for another one or for the overall decentralization process.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15854.

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Date of creation: Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15854

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Related research
Keywords: constitutions; deregulation; decentralization; fiscal decentralization; administrative decentralization; devolution;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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  1. Vladimir Popov, 2004. "Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Rules versus Electoral Politics," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 46(4), pages 515-541, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sharma, Chanchal Kumar, 2004. "Decentralization Dilemma: Measuring the Degree and Evaluating the Outcomes," MPRA Paper 204, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2005. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrew Chesher, 2008. "Instrumental variable models for discrete outcomes," CeMMAP working papers CWP30/08, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Wallace E. Oates, 2002. "Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 3(4), pages 377-390, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Federalism and Decentralization – A Critical Survey of Frequently Used Indicators," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200821, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  6. Steven Rosefielde & Natalia Vennikova, 2004. "Fiscal federalism in Russia: a critique of the OECD proposals," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 307-318, March.
  7. Ebel, Robert D. & Yilmaz, Serdar, 2002. "On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2809, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Irina Slinko & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya & Evgeny Yakovlev, 2005. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 284-318. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Feld, Lars P. & Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Schnellenbach, Jan, 2008. "On government centralization and fiscal referendums," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 611-645, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jan Schnellenbach & Lars Feld & Christoph schaltegger, 2007. "The Impact of Referendums on the Centralisation of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach," Working Papers 0440, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised May 2007. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Arzaghi, Mohammad & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2005. "Why countries are fiscally decentralizing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1157-1189, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1997. "I Just Ran Two Million Regressions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 178-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Koleman S. Strumpf & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 2002. "Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 1-36, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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