A Postfunctionalist Theory of Regional Government
AbstractThe structure of government―the number of tiers and the allocation of tasks over these tiers―has been a subject of political research since Althusius (1603) and Pufendorf (1672). More recently, the process of European integration revived the interest in the allocation of tasks across government tiers.1 One approach to this topic is the subsidiarity principle of the European Union which states that matters ought to be handled by the lowest feasible tier. However, the subsidiarity principle has also been used by the member states of the European Union as an argument to safeguard national autonomy (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994). The precise allocation of tasks across government tiers remains a matter of fierce normative and empirical debate.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 21596.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
federalism; decentralization; regional authority; fiscal indicators;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
- H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006.
"Decentralization and Political Institutions,"
w0065, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Economics Working Papers 0045, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002.
"Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
- Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2000. "Decentralization and corruption - evidence across countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2290, The World Bank.
- Akai, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo, 2002. "Fiscal decentralization contributes to economic growth: evidence from state-level cross-section data for the United States," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 93-108, July.
- Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
- Sharma, Chanchal Kumar, 2004. "Decentralization Dilemma: Measuring the Degree and Evaluating the Outcomes," MPRA Paper 204, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2005.
- Arzaghi, Mohammad & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2005. "Why countries are fiscally decentralizing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1157-1189, July.
- Ebel, Robert D. & Yilmaz, Serdar, 2002. "On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2809, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.