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The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach

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  • Jan Schnellenbach

    ()

  • Lars Feld

    ()

  • Christoph Schaltegger

    ()

Abstract

The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

Volume (Year): 11 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 3-26

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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:11:y:2010:i:1:p:3-26

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Related research

Keywords: Centralisation; Direct democracy; Representative democracy; Public good provision; H11; H77; H72; H73;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
    [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O
    ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Martin Gregor & Lenka Šastná, 2011. "The Decentralization Tradeoff for Complementary Spillovers," Working Papers IES 2011/13, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Apr 2011.
  3. Martin Gregor, 2012. "Modeling positive inter-jurisdictional public spending spillovers," Working Papers IES 2012/16, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2012.
  4. Lars P. Feld & Justina A. V. Fischer & Gebhard Kirchgassner, 2006. "The effect of direct democracy on income redistribution: evidence for Switzerland," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19287, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Janos Feidler & Klaas Staal, 2012. "Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 73-93, March.
  6. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Voting on Devolution in a Federal Country with a Bicameral National System," Working Papers - Economics wp2007_09, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  7. Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls," Munich Reprints in Economics 19268, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  8. Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Federalism and Decentralization – A Critical Survey of Frequently Used Indicators," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200821, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  9. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization," MPRA Paper 15854, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Feld, Lars P. & Fischer, Justina A.V. & Kirchgaessner, Gebhard, 2007. "The Effect of Direct Democratic Institutions on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 689, Stockholm School of Economics.
  11. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Endogenous (De)Centralization and the Russian Federalism," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 9(1), pages 23-57.
  12. Thomas Döring & Jan Schnellenbach, 2011. "A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 83-102, March.

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