This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Redoano, Michela
Scharf, Kimberley Ann
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This paper analyses policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and inter-jurisdictional policy spillovers under two alternative political procedures: direct referendum and representative democracy. We show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policymakers rather than by referendum. In these situations, centralized policies converge to the preferred level of the jurisdiction that least favours centralization, rather than to a compromise between the two jurisdictions’ preferred levels.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
3631.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2002Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3631Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Order Information: Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Keywords: centralization ; harmonization ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992.
"The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000.
"Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2495, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991.
"Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-59, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1995.
"Delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 319-333, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998.
"Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1991.
"Delegation Games in Customs Unions ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(2), pages 391-97, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Dhillon, Amrita & Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley A., 1999.
"Implementing tax coordination ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 243-268, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Dhillon, A. & Perroni, C. & Scharf, K.A., 1997.
"Implementing Tax Coordination ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
501, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
Amrita Dhillon & Carlo Perroni & Kim Scharf, 1997.
"Implementing tax co-ordination ,"
IFS Working Papers
W97/12, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Amrita Dhillon & Carlo Perroni & Kimberley A. Scharf, .
"Implementing Tax Coordination ,"
EPRU Working Paper Series
97-09, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
Other versions: Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars Feld, 2001.
"On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Bloch, Francis & Zenginobuz, Unal, 2004.
"The Effect of Spillovers on the Provision of Local Public Goods ,"
MPRA Paper
186, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Oct 2006.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2004.
"On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures ,"
cege â Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers
25, cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany)..
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2004.
"On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures ,"
Kiel Working Papers
1209, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
[Downloadable!] Lorz, Oliver & Willmann, Gerald, 2005.
"On the endogenous allocation of decision powers in federal structures ,"
Journal of Urban Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 242-257, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Feld, Lars P. & Fischer, Justina A.V. & Kirchgaessner, Gebhard, 2007.
"The Effect of Direct Democratic Institutions on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland ,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
689, Stockholm School of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2008.
"Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-off Facing Economic Unions ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars Feld, 2001.
"On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Peter Tuchyòa & Martin Gregor, 2005.
"Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxes ,"
Working Papers IES
81, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
[Downloadable!]
Hans-Günter Krüsselberg, 2005.
"Milton Friedman und der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen Elternkompetenz und Anteilscheine am Schulbudget – Gedanken über Reformpotenziale ,"
Marburg Working Papers on Economics
200506, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
[Downloadable!]
Feng Xie & David Levinson, 2009.
"Governance choice on a serial network ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 189-212, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cheikbossian, G., 2004.
"Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System ,"
Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers)
2004.12, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
[Downloadable!]
Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger & Jan Schnellenbach, 2005.
"On Government Centralization and Fiscal Referendums: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Switzerland ,"
CREMA Working Paper Series
2005-18, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Stegarescu, Dan, 2004.
"Economic Integration and Fiscal Decentralization : Evidence from OECD Countries ,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
04-86, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2004.
"Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized system ,"
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique ,
ADRES, issue 75-76, pages 20, Juillet-D.
[Downloadable!]
Edward López & R. Jewell, 2007.
"Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 137-157, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Martin Gregor & Peter Tuchyňa, 2007.
"Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxation ,"
AUCO Czech Economic Review ,
Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(3), pages 223-253, November.
[Downloadable!]
Lars P. Feld & Justina A.V. Fischer & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2006.
"The Effect of Direct Democracy on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Access and
download statistics Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .