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The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy

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Redoano, Michela
Scharf, Kimberley Ann

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Abstract

This paper analyses policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and inter-jurisdictional policy spillovers under two alternative political procedures: direct referendum and representative democracy. We show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policymakers rather than by referendum. In these situations, centralized policies converge to the preferred level of the jurisdiction that least favours centralization, rather than to a compromise between the two jurisdictions’ preferred levels.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3631.

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Date of creation: Nov 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3631

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Keywords: centralization; harmonization;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 2495, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-59, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1995. "Delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 319-333, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1991. "Delegation Games in Customs Unions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(2), pages 391-97, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Dhillon, Amrita & Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley A., 1999. "Implementing tax coordination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 243-268, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  10. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars Feld, 2001. "On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bloch, Francis & Zenginobuz, Unal, 2004. "The Effect of Spillovers on the Provision of Local Public Goods," MPRA Paper 186, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2004. "On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures," cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 25, cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany).. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Feld, Lars P. & Fischer, Justina A.V. & Kirchgaessner, Gebhard, 2007. "The Effect of Direct Democratic Institutions on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 689, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2008. "Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-off Facing Economic Unions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars Feld, 2001. "On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Peter Tuchyòa & Martin Gregor, 2005. "Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxes," Working Papers IES 81, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hans-Günter Krüsselberg, 2005. "Milton Friedman und der Wissenschaftliche Beirat für Familienfragen Elternkompetenz und Anteilscheine am Schulbudget – Gedanken über Reformpotenziale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200506, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  8. Feng Xie & David Levinson, 2009. "Governance choice on a serial network," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 189-212, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Cheikbossian, G., 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2004.12, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
  10. Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger & Jan Schnellenbach, 2005. "On Government Centralization and Fiscal Referendums: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Switzerland," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-18, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Stegarescu, Dan, 2004. "Economic Integration and Fiscal Decentralization : Evidence from OECD Countries," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-86, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  12. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized system," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 75-76, pages 20, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
  13. Edward López & R. Jewell, 2007. "Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 137-157, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Martin Gregor & Peter Tuchyňa, 2007. "Centralization Trade-off with Non-Uniform Taxation," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(3), pages 223-253, November. [Downloadable!]
  15. Lars P. Feld & Justina A.V. Fischer & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2006. "The Effect of Direct Democracy on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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