Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political competition and leadership in tax competition

Contents:

Author Info

  • Rupayan Pal

    ()
    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

  • Ajay Sharma

    ()
    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce political competition in a sequential move tax competition game between two regions for foreign owned mobile capital. It shows that in case of sequential move, political delegation takes place only in the follower region, not in the leader region. Moreover, political competition need not necessarily lead to higher tax rate in equilibrium. These results are in the sharp contrast to the existing results.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2011-024.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India in its series Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers with number 2011-024.

as in new window
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2011-024

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Gen. A. K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (E), Mumbai 400065
Phone: (022) 840 0919/20/21
Fax: (022) 840 2752/2026
Email:
Web page: http://www.igidr.ac.in
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Mobile capital; Tax competition; Political competition; Leadership; Public good;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Carlo Perroni & Kimberley A. Scharf, . "Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 97-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  2. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
  3. Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in the tax competition race," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL halshs-00492105, HAL.
  4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain & John D. Wilson, 2007. "Why Do Most Countries Set High Tax Rates on Capital?," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 0711, CIRPEE.
  6. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Existence of Nash equilibria in fiscal competition models," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 283-296, May.
  7. Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in the tax competition race," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10039, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  8. Wilson, John Douglas, 2005. "Welfare-improving competition for mobile capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-18, January.
  9. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659 Elsevier.
  11. Ihori, Toshihiro & Yang, C.C., 2009. "Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 210-217, November.
  12. Kempf, Hubert & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 768-776, October.
  13. Brückner, Matthias, 2001. "Strategic delegation and international capital taxation," ZEI Working Papers, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn B 22-2001, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  14. Rosanne Altshuler & Timothy J. Goodspeed, 2002. "Follow the Leader? Evidence on European and U.S. Tax Competition," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics 200226, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  15. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
  16. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
  17. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 2001. "Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in a Median Voter Model," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 97-113, April.
  18. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  19. Kempf, H. & Rota Graziosi, G., 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition: a timing game perspective," Working papers, Banque de France 299, Banque de France.
  20. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
  21. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2001. "Tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 20292, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  22. Janeba, Eckhard & Peters, Wolfgang, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains from Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(452), pages 93-101, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2011-024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamprasad M. Pujar).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.