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Implementing Tax Coordination Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Dhillon, A.
Perroni, C.
Scharf, K.A.
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This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. WE focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders, and where jurisdictions have different public goods requirements, but are otherwise identical. In this setting, coordination may call for a second-best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates. If, however, information on jurisdictions' types is private or nonverifiable, such a second-best allocation may not be implementable.
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Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number
501.
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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1997Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:501Contact details of provider: Postal: CV4 7AL COVENTRY Phone: +44 (0) 2476 523202 Fax: +44 (0) 2476 523032 Web page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: TAXATION ; COMPETITION ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
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