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Implementing Tax Coordination

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  • Dhillon, A.
  • Perroni, C.
  • Scharf, K.A.

Abstract

This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. WE focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders, and where jurisdictions have different public goods requirements, but are otherwise identical. In this setting, coordination may call for a second-best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates. If, however, information on jurisdictions' types is private or nonverifiable, such a second-best allocation may not be implementable.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 501.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:501

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Keywords: TAXATION ; COMPETITION;

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References

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  1. Gordon, R.H. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1994. "Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally?: Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation," Working Papers 358, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  2. Philippe Bacchetta & Maria Paz Espinosa, 1993. "Information Sharing and Tax Competition Among Governments," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0028, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
  3. Lockwood, Ben, 1993. "Commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 141-162, September.
  4. Horst Raff & John Wilson, 1997. "Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 407-427, November.
  5. BUCOVETSKY, Sam & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1997. "Tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure," CORE Discussion Papers 1997003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June.
  7. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  8. Huizinga, H.P. & Nielsen, S.B., 1997. "The taxation of interest in Europe: A minimum withholding tax?," Discussion Paper 1997-73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. de Crombrugghe, Alain & Tulkens, Henry, 1990. "On Pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 335-350, April.
  10. Richard C. Cornes & Emilson C. D. Silva, 2003. "Public Good Mix in a Federation with Incomplete Information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 381-397, 04.
  11. Keen, Michael, 1987. "Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-114, June.
  12. Gordon, Roger H & Wilson, John Douglas, 1986. "An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1357-73, November.
  13. Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., . "Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1218, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Keen, Michael, 1989. "Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-12, January.
  15. Turunen-Red, Arja H & Woodland, Alan D, 1990. "Multilateral Reform of Domestic Taxes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 160-86, January.
  16. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Janeba, Eckhard & Smart, Michael, 2003. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 259-80, May.
  2. Amrita Dhillon & Myrna H. Wooders & Ben Zissimos, 2006. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0602, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  3. PERALTA, Susana & van YPERSELE, Tanguy, 2002. "Coordination of capital taxation among Asymmetric countries," CORE Discussion Papers 2002032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Furceri, Davide & Karras, Georgios, 2010. "Tax Design in the OECD: A test of the Hines-Summers Hypothesis," MPRA Paper 23358, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Bruce A. Blonigen & Lindsay Oldenski & Nicholas Sly, 2011. "Separating the Opposing Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties," NBER Working Papers 17480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Michela Redoano & Kimberley Ann Scharf, 2001. "The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 602, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Sorensen, Peter Birch, 2004. "International tax coordination: regionalism versus globalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1187-1214, June.
  8. Neumann, Rebecca & Holman, Jill & Alm, James, 2009. "Globalization and tax policy," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 193-211, August.
  9. Rizzo Leonzio, 2006. "Le inefficienze della competizione fiscale: una rassegna dei principali modelli teorici," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 89-120.
  10. Costas Hadjiyiannis & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2001. "Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block," CESifo Working Paper Series 524, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Krause, Günter, 2004. "On the role of budgeting in the delegated provision of public goods under asymmetric information," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 51, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
  12. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
  13. Kolmar, Martin, 2002. "Income redistribution in an economic union: Does asymmetric information legitimize centralization?," Discussion Papers, Series 1 317, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  14. Hristu-Varsakelis, Dimitrios & Karagianni, Stella & Saraidaris, Anastasios, 2011. "Equilibrium conditions in corporate tax competition and Foreign Direct Investment flows," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 13-21, January.
  15. Krause, Günter, 2004. "The provision of public inputs in a federation under asymmetric information," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 52, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.

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