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Implementing Tax Coordination

Author

Listed:
  • Dhillon, A.
  • Perroni, C.
  • Scharf, K.A.

Abstract

This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. WE focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders, and where jurisdictions have different public goods requirements, but are otherwise identical. In this setting, coordination may call for a second-best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates. If, however, information on jurisdictions' types is private or nonverifiable, such a second-best allocation may not be implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhillon, A. & Perroni, C. & Scharf, K.A., 1997. "Implementing Tax Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 501, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:501
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Janeba, Eckhard & Smart, Michael, 2003. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(3), pages 259-280, May.
    3. Amrita Dhillon & Myrna Wooders & Ben Zissimos, 2007. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 391-423, June.
    4. Panos Hatzipanayotou & Costas Hadjiyiannis & Michael S. Michael, 2002. "Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 442-458, August.
    5. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers P181, FERDI.
    6. Tosun Mehmet S & Skidmore Mark L, 2007. "Cross-Border Shopping and the Sales Tax: An Examination of Food Purchases in West Virginia," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-20, December.
    7. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 2017. "The impressive contribution of Canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1348-1380, December.
    8. Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 708-726, November.
    9. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    10. Davide Furceri & Georgios Karras, 2011. "Tax Design in the OECD: A Test of the Hines-Summers Hypothesis," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 37(2), pages 239-247.
    11. Kolmar, Martin, 2002. "Income redistribution in an economic union: Does asymmetric information legitimize centralization?," Discussion Papers, Series I 317, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    12. Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberly A., 2004. "The political economy of policy centralization: direct versus representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 799-817, March.
    13. Hristu-Varsakelis, Dimitrios & Karagianni, Stella & Saraidaris, Anastasios, 2011. "Equilibrium conditions in corporate tax competition and Foreign Direct Investment flows," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 13-21, January.
    14. Krause, Günter, 2004. "The provision of public inputs in a federation under asymmetric information," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 52, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    15. Patricia Sanz‐Córdoba & Bernd Theilen, 2018. "Partial Tax Harmonization Through Infrastructure Coordination," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1399-1416, April.
    16. Krause, Günter, 2004. "On the role of budgeting in the delegated provision of public goods under asymmetric information," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 51, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    17. Bruce A. Blonigen & Lindsay Oldenski & Nicholas Sly, 2011. "Separating the Opposing Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties," NBER Working Papers 17480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Leonzio Rizzo, 2006. "Le inefficienze della competizione fiscale: una rassegna dei principali modelli teorici," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 89-120.
    19. Neumann, Rebecca & Holman, Jill & Alm, James, 2009. "Globalization and tax policy," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 193-211, August.
    20. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    21. Hristu-Varsakelis, Dimitrios & Karagianni, Stella & Saraidaris, Anastasios, 2011. "Equilibrium conditions in corporate tax competition and Foreign Direct Investment flows," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-21.
    22. Sorensen, Peter Birch, 2004. "International tax coordination: regionalism versus globalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1187-1214, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    TAXATION ; COMPETITION;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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