Implementing Tax Coordination

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Implementing Tax Coordination

Author Info

Amrita Dhillon
Carlo Perroni
Kimberley A. Scharf

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. We focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across jurisdictions, and where the two jurisdictions have different public good requirements, but are otherwise identical. In this setting, coordination may call for a second-best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates for the two jurisdictions. If, however, information on jurisdiction types is private, such a second-best allocation may not be implementable. We show that the presence of private information will generally affect not only the choice of harmonized rates in states where jurisdictions are different, but also the choice of harmonized rates in states where jurisdictions have identical public good requirements.

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Paper provided by Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series EPRU Working Paper Series with number 97-09.

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Handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:97-09

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Article
- Dhillon, Amrita & Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley A., 1999. "Implementing tax coordination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 243-268, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Dhillon, A. & Perroni, C. & Scharf, K.A., 1997. "Implementing Tax Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 501, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Amrita Dhillon & Carlo Perroni & Kim Scharf, 1997. "Implementing tax co-ordination," IFS Working Papers W97/12, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

Cited by:
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Costas Hadjiyiannis & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2001. "Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hatzipanayotou, Panos & Hadjiyiannis, Costas & Michael, Michael S, 2002. "Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision within a Trading Block," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(3), pages 442-58, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Contests with Size Effects," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2005. "Contests with Size Effects," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Paper No. 2, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2004. "Contests with Size Effects," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Eggert, Wolfgang & Kolmar, Martin, 2006. "Contests with size effects," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 989-1008, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eckhard Janeba & Michael Smart, 2003. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies?," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 259-280, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Eckhard Janeba & Michael Smart, 2001. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Janeba, Eckhard & Smart, Michael, 2003. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 259-80, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mark Skidmore & Mehmet Serkan Tosun, 2005. "Cross-Border Shopping and the Sales Tax: A Reexamination of Food Purchases in West Virginia," Working Papers 05-07, UW-Whitewater, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Mehmet Tosun & Mark Skidmore, 2007. "Cross-Border Shopping and the Sales Tax: An Examination of Food Purchases in West Virginia," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1877-1877. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wolfgang Eggert & Laszlo Goerke, . "Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Eggert, Wolfgang & Goerke, Laszlo, 2003. "Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 937, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Wolfgang Eggert & Laszlo Goerke, 2003. "Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and Unemployment," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2003. "Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 3695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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- PERALTA, Susana & van YPERSELE, Tanguy, 2002. "Coordination of capital taxation among symmetric countries," CORE Discussion Papers 2002032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
- Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 708-726, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberley Ann, 2002. "The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3631, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberley A., 2001. "The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberly A., 2004. "The political economy of policy centralization: direct versus representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 799-817, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Wooders, Myrna & Zissimos, Ben & Dhillon, Amrita, 2001. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 622, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Amrita Dhillon & Myrna H. Wooders & Ben Zissimos, 2006. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," Working Papers 0602, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
- Amrita Dhillon & Myrna Wooders & Ben Zissimos, 2007. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 391-423, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin Kolmar, 2003. "Income Redistribution in an Economic Union: Does Asymmetric Information Legitimize Centralization?," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 169-186, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Kolmar, Martin, 2003. "Income Redistribution in an Economic Union: Does Asymmetric Information Legitimize Centralization?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 169-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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