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Implementing tax co-ordination

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Author Info
Amrita Dhillon
Carlo Perroni
Kim Scharf () (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Warwick)

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. We focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across jurisdictions, and where the two jurisdictions have different public good requirements, but are otherwise identical. In this setting, coordination may call for a second-best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates for the two jurisdictions. If, however, information on jurisdiction types is private, such a second-best allocation may not be implementable. We show that the presence of private information will generally affect not only the choice of coordinated rates in states where jurisdictions are different, but also the choice of harmonized rates in states where jurisdictions have identical public good requirements

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Fiscal Studies in its series IFS Working Papers with number W97/12.

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Date of creation: Aug 1997
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Handle: RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:97/12

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  1. Eckhard Janeba & Michael Smart, 2001. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberley Ann, 2002. "The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3631, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Mark Skidmore & Mehmet Serkan Tosun, 2005. "Cross-Border Shopping and the Sales Tax: A Reexamination of Food Purchases in West Virginia," Working Papers 05-07, UW-Whitewater, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Wolfgang Eggert & Laszlo Goerke, . "Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Costas Hadjiyiannis & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2001. "Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2003. "Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 3695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Contests with Size Effects," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Wooders, Myrna & Zissimos, Ben & Dhillon, Amrita, 2001. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 622, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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