Nonlinear Income Taxation And Matching Grants In A Federation With Decentralized In-Kind Transfers
AbstractWe extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in-kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. Local governments have a cost advantage, motivating decentralization of the in-kind transfer. The cost structure varies across regions, and the central government cannot observe which region is which. We show that decentralized in-kind transfers can, in this setting, be an even more important instrument for relaxing self-selection constraints, thus, helping redistribution, than in single-government models. We characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants. The grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies. Copyright � (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 50 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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- Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar & Micheletto, Luca, 2011. "Public provision of private goods, self-selection and income tax avoidance," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2011:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
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