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Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

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Author Info
Bucovetsky, S.
Marchand, M.
Pestieau, P.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WMG-45J5BCG-4/2/b4fc74d50cd7f43e59a820681f3c2520
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Urban Economics.

Volume (Year): 44 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 367-390
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Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:44:y:1998:i:3:p:367-390

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905

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