The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy
AbstractThis paper examines policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction, political economy model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and interjurisdictional policy spillovers, under alternative democratic choice procedures, namely, direct democracy and representative democracy. We show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policymakers rather than by referendum. The reason for this result is that delegation of the harmonization choice to elected policymakers can effectively act as a policy commitment device by a pro-centralization jurisdiction and induce a reluctant partner to cooperate. In these situations, policy centralization will result in policies converging towards the choice preferred by the reluctant partner, rather than in a dilution of policy preferences.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 602.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
international cooperation; trade and environmental policy negotiations;
Other versions of this item:
- Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberly A., 2004. "The political economy of policy centralization: direct versus representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 799-817, March.
- Redoano, Michela & Scharf, Kimberley Ann, 2002. "The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3631, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, .
""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy'',"
CARESS Working Papres
95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991.
"Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-59, August.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd & Ehud Kalai, 1990. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," Discussion Papers 879, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dhillon, A. & Perroni, C. & Scharf, K.A., 1997.
"Implementing Tax Coordination,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
501, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Amrita Dhillon & Carlo Perroni & Kim Scharf, 1997. "Implementing tax co-ordination," IFS Working Papers W97/12, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Amrita Dhillon & Carlo Perroni & Kimberley A. Scharf, . "Implementing Tax Coordination," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-09, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Does centralization increase the size of government?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 765-773, April.
- Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1995. "Delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 319-333, February.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.
- Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1989.
"Delegation Games in Customs Unions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
337, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1990.
"The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration,"
NBER Working Papers
3460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701, October.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1999.
"Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Analysis,"
NBER Working Papers
7084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 2495, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Charles Blankart, 2000. "The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 27-39, March.
- Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2001. "On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 615, CESifo Group Munich.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.