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Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions

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  • Alexander Libman

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    Abstract

    This article considers the impact of sub-national political systems on economic growth by applying the case of Russian regions from 2000 to 2004. It investigates two dimensions of the sub-national systems. First, it studies the influence of democracy on economic performance, providing evidence of a non-linear relationship between democracy and economic growth. Regions with high levels of democracy, as well as strong autocracies, perform better than hybrid regimes. Second, this article considers the influence of the size of the bureaucracy on economic outcomes and confirms the “grabbing hand” view on bureaucracy rather than the Weberian idea. Increasing the size of the bureaucracy is associated with a decline in economic performance. In addition, this article analyzes the potential interaction between these two characteristics of sub-national politics as factors of economic growth, but does not establish any robust results. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00181-011-0525-5
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Empirical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 43 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 1321-1352

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:43:y:2012:i:3:p:1321-1352

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    Related research

    Keywords: Democracy; Bureaucracy; Sub-national political systems; Economic growth; Russian regions; D72; D73; O18; O43; P26;

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    Cited by:
    1. Libman, Alexander & Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten & Yadav, Gaurav, 2013. "Are human rights and economic well-being substitutes? The evidence from migration patterns across the Indian states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 139-164.
    2. Sergei Guriev & Elena Vakulenko, 2012. "Convergence between Russian regions," Working Papers w0180, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    3. Hagemann, Harald & Kufenko, Vadim, 2014. "The political Kuznets curve for Russia: Income inequality, rent seeking regional elites and empirical determinants of protests during 2011/2012," Violette Reihe Arbeitspapiere 39/2013, Promotionsschwerpunkt "Globalisierung und Beschaeftigung".
    4. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Democracy and growth: is the effect non-linear?," MPRA Paper 17795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 82-99.

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