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Fiscal federalist relations in Russia: a case for subnational autonomy

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  • Lavrov, Aleksei
  • Litwack, John
  • Sutherland, Douglas

Abstract

In a federation as large and diverse as Russia, the policies of regional and local governments play a key role in determining economic outcomes. The state of intergovernmental and fiscal federalist relations directly affects the nature of these policies. Several existing studies highlight common problems in the conduct of regional and local state organs in Russia as key obstacles to the improvement of the business and investment climate. In this light, since early 1998, the Economics Department of the OECD has been carrying out special work on fiscal federalism and regional finance in the Russian Federation as part of a programme of the OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members (CCNM). This work has involved the close co-operation of the Russian government, especially the Ministry of Finance, 10 representative Subjects of the Federation, and a number of local administrations during 1998-2000. The primary objectives have been a better understanding of problems in budgetary finance at the subnational level, the motivations behind regional and local economic policies, and the implications for reform of fiscal federalist relations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26537.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26537

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Keywords: Russia; fiscal federalist relations;

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References

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  1. Johnson, Simon & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After Communism," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Soft Budget Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 3-30.
  3. Berkowitz, Daniel & Li, Wei, 2000. "Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 369-397, June.
  4. Wildasin, David E., 1998. "Fiscal aspect of evolving federations : issues for policy and research," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1884, The World Bank.
  5. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
  6. Timothy Frye & Andrei Shleifer, 1996. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," NBER Working Papers 5856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 43-64, Fall.
  8. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 8.
  9. Eckhard Wurzel, 1999. "Towards More Efficient Government: Reforming Federal Fiscal Relations in Germany," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 209, OECD Publishing.
  10. Richard Miller Bird, 1999. "Rethinking Subnational Taxes," IMF Working Papers 99/165, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Sebastian M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 169-209, May.
  12. Bajpai, N. & Sachs, J.D., 1999. "The State of State Government Finances in India," Papers, Harvard - Institute for International Development 719, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," Working Papers w0031, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  2. Desai, Raj M. & Freinkman, Lev & Goldberg, Itzhak, 2005. "Fiscal federalism in rentier regions: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 814-834, December.
  3. Slinko, Irina & Yakovlev, Evgeny & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Institutional Subversion: Evidence from Russian Regions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4024, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Haaparanta, Pertti & Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga & Pirttilä, Jukka & Solanko, Laura & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Firms and public service provision in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition 16/2003, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  5. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2002. "Asymmetric Federalism in Russia: Cure or Poison?," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University paper0304, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  6. Kwon, Goohoon & Spilimbergo, Antonio, 2005. "Russia's Regions: Income Volatility, Labour Mobility and Fiscal Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5265, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Elliott Parker & Judith Thornton, 2007. "Fiscal Centralisation and Decentralisation in Russia and China," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(4), pages 514-542, December.
  8. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
  9. Jack Diamond, 2002. "Budget System Reform in Transitional Economies," IMF Working Papers 02/22, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Irina N. Ilina & Carol S. Leonard & Evgenij E. Plisetskij, 2014. "Russian Regional Resilience: Finance, Cooperation And Resource Abundance (A Case Study Of Khanty-Mansiysk)," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics WP BRP 15/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  11. Alisher Akhmedjonov & Irina N. Il’ina & Carol S. Leonard & Zafar Nazarov & Evgenij E. Plisetskij & Elena S. Vakulenko, 2013. "Russia’s regions: governance and Well-being, 2000-2008," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics WP BRP 42/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  12. Ponomareva, Maria & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2004. "Federal Tax Arrears in Russia: Liquidity Problems, Federal Redistribution or Russian Resistance?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4267, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence," Working Papers w0038, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

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