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Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America

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  • John Dove

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  • John Dove, 2012. "Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 66-93, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:23:y:2012:i:1:p:66-93
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-011-9114-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Joseph Wallis, 2000. "American Government Finance in the Long Run: 1790 to 1990," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 61-82, Winter.
    2. John Joseph Wallis, 2001. "What Caused the Crisis of 1839?," NBER Historical Working Papers 0133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    4. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-358, May.
    5. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    6. Goodrich, Carter, 1950. "The Revulsion Against Internal Improvements," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 145-169, November.
    7. Wallis, John Joseph, 2005. "Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 211-256, March.
    8. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 43-64, Fall.
    9. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    10. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
    11. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    12. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza & W Mark C Weidemaier & Gracie Willingham, 0. "When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 41-74.
    2. Sergey Zhavoronkov & Konstantin Yanovskiy & Kirill Rodionov, 2015. "Political Factors of the Cuts and Surges in Government Spending: The Effects on Old Market Democracies and Post-Communist Countries," Working Papers 146, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2015.
    3. Zuccardi Huertas Igor Esteban, 2015. "Sovereign Spreads in the Eurozone: Is Market Discipline Working?," Working Papers 2015-20, Banco de México.
    4. John A. Dove, 2017. "Property Tax Limits, Balanced Budget Rules, and Line-Item Vetoes: A Long-Run View," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 288-317, March.
    5. Beach, Brian, 2022. "Water infrastructure and health in U.S. cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt; Default; Credible commitments; Constitutional constraints; D78; H63; H73; N41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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