Estimation of the Russia’s trade policy options with the help of the Computable General Equilibrium Model
AbstractThe computable general equilibrium model was used in assessing different Russia’s trade policy options. The base experiment lying in the core of our investigation is simulation of the EU eastward enlargement. According to our calculations Russia does not loose in the resulting equilibrium. This is not a zero-sum process from a point of view of Russia’s social welfare. The other experiments are: simulation of Russia’s WTO accession and creation of the Common European Economic Space. Change in the tariffs associated with the possible WTO accession is so small relative to the existing level of tariffs, that it does not give a significant change in the Russian economic environment. Significant changes are associated with the creation of the CEES as a free trade area between Russia and the enlarged Europe. If an FTA agreement will cover all goods and services, this will give a negative effect on the Russian economy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0042.
Length: 62 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 117418 Russia, Moscow, Nakhimovsky pr., 47, office 720
Phone: +7 (495) 105 50 02
Fax: +7 (495) 105 50 03
Web page: http://www.cefir.ru
More information through EDIRC
CGE models; enlargement of the European Union; Russia’s WTO accession; Free Trade Area;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-TRA-2004-11-07 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sonin, Konstantin, 2003.
CEPR Discussion Papers
3973, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1993.
"The Politics of Free Trade Agreements,"
NBER Working Papers
4597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 908, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements," Papers 14-93, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements," Papers 166, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Konstantin Sonin, 2003.
"Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights,"
w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. "Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 715-731, December.
- Konstantin Sonin, 2002. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 544, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman & Andrei Shleifer, 2002.
"The Injustice of Inequality,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1967, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
- Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000.
"Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2381, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, daniel, 2000. ""Seize the state, seize the day": state capture, corruption, and influence in transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2444, The World Bank.
- Cai, Hongbin & Treisman, Daniel, 2004. "State corroding federalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 819-843, March.
- Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006.
"State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin,"
w0094, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Pavel Kadochnikov, 2006. "An Analysis of Import Substitution in Russia after the 1998 Crisis," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 95, pages 148.
- Oksana Harbuzyuk & Stefan Lutz, 2008.
"Analyzing trade opening in Ukraine: effects of a customs union with the EU,"
Economic Change and Restructuring,
Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 221-238, September.
- Harbuzyuk, Oksana & Lutz, Stefan, 2004. "Analyzing trade opening in Ukraine: Effects of a customs union with the EU," ZEI Working Papers B 26-2004, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
- Yaroslav Lissovolik & Bogdan Lissovolik, 2004. "Russia and the WTO: The "Gravity" of Outsider Status," IMF Working Papers 04/159, International Monetary Fund.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julia Babich).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.