State Capture and Controlling Owners of Firms

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State Capture and Controlling Owners of Firms

Author Info

Evgeny Yakovlev (CEFIR)
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya () (New Economic School/CEFIR and CEPR)

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Abstract

How does the effect “state capture” depend the identity of the captor? We use a dataset on preferential treatment of selected firms by regional legislature and regulatory agencies in transitional Russia to show that the most effective and the least benign captors are “federal oligarchs” i.e., the firms within groups that have representation in more than two regions. Preferential treatments given to the federal oligarchs bring them higher than average benefits in terms of performance boost. Other firms in the region suffer more from capture by the federal oligarchs than when capture is carried out by other firms. In contrast, firms that are controlled by large regional owners do not have a strong effect of preferential treatments on either their own performance or performance of other regional firms.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0044.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0044

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
P27 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin," Working Papers w0094, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2005. "State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin," Working Papers w0052, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-10-26.

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