Using a time-series approach, the author analyzes the relationship between the extent of rent-seeking trade policy and both political and economic variables. For rent-seeking trade policy, the indicator he uses is the number of foreign-trade regulations passed each year for the benefit of a single firm or industry. The author uses data from Uruguay for 1925-83. Uruguay, which experienced an impressive economic decline, is an outstanding example of a rent-seeking society. After being a wealthy economy in midcentury, it suffered almost complete stagnation, which led to social and policital disintegration by the end of the 1960s. Three decades of restrictive regulations on foreign trade had created a nearly closed economy by the end of the 1960s. It was worth analyzing whether policymakers'great receptiveness to demands for protection could account for Uruguay's decline. Over the period 1925-83, the author finds almost 4,000 laws, decrees, and administrative resolutions that create, maintain, or modify a foreign-trade regulation for the benefit of a single firm or industry. About half of them explicitly identify the petitioner - usually a firm or guild. Since the size of the Uruguayan economy changed over the period studied, the author scales the annual number of regulations by output or exports to measure the extent of rent-seeking trade policy. The author shows that the extent of rent-seeking trade policy increased with discretionary policies and under dictatorship. (In the period studied, there were two stages of democracy - until 1932 and from 1943-72 - and two stages of dictatorship.) He also shows that rent-seeking trade restrictions increased under import-substitution strategies and, more unexpectedly, under active export promotion. This suggests that discretionary power leads to wasteful distribution, whether it is used to support inward- or outward-oriented policies. Finally, the author analyzes the correlation between innovations in the trade policy indicator and innovations in the growth rates of output and exports, with a lag of up to 20 years. Surprisingly, he finds a positive correlation with output growth rates after two or three years. But the correlation becomes negative some years later, particularly in the case of exports. The short-run positive impact on growth rates, together with the surprisingly long time lag before the negative impact, may account for policymakers'receptiveness to demands for protection.
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