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Does greater accountability improve the quality of delivery of public services? Evidence from Uganda

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  • Deininger, Klaus
  • Mpuga, Paul

Abstract

While the importance of corruption as a possible impediment to foreign investment in an international context is now well realized, it is not clear to what extent corruption affects, either directly through bribe-taking or indirectly through inadequate quality of public services, the level of economic activity by domestic entrepreneurs. Using a large survey from Uganda, the authors show that domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, government officials, and households are unanimous in highlighting the pervasiveness and importance of corruption. Efforts to establish institutions to deal with corrupt practices have not been matched by public education on the proper procedures. The fact that such lack of knowledge on procedures to report corruption increases households'risk of being subject to bribery and significantly reduces the quality of public service delivery leads the authors to conclude that improved accountability will be important to reduce the incidence of corruption and improve delivery of public services.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3277.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3277

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Keywords: Decentralization; Enterprise Development&Reform; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Poverty Monitoring&Analysis; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; TF054599-PHRD-KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: WATER MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT; Governance Indicators; National Governance;

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Cited by:
  1. Jennifer Hunt & Sonia Laszlo, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What Are the Payoffs?," NBER Working Papers 11635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2012. "Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 355-372.

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