Corruption and Policy: Back to the Roots
AbstractCorruption is now recognized to be a pervasive phenomenon that can seriously jeopardize the best-intentioned reform efforts. This paper presents an analytical framework for examining the role basic market institutions play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. The empirical results suggest that high barriers to new business entry and soft budget constraints on incumbent firms are particularly important institutional factors engendering opportunities for corruption. The findings also support the notion that economic development and maturation of democratic processes both temper corruption, as does, to a lesser extent, openness to international trade.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Economic Policy Reform.
Volume (Year): 5 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GPRE19
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Broadman, H.G., 1998. "Rurrain Trade Policy reform for WTO Accession," World Bank - Discussion Papers 401, World Bank.
- Johnson, Simon & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999.
"Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After Communism,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 2000. "Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 495-520, June.
- Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufmann & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2003. "Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism," Public Economics 0308004, EconWPA.
- Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
- Broadman, Harry G., 2000. "Reducing structural dominance and entry barriers in Russian industry," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2330, The World Bank.
- Harry Broadman, 2000. "Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 155-175, September.
- Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2000. "Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 459-493, June.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
- Ratbek, Ratbek, 2010. "Nonlinear effect of corruption, uncertainty, and growth," MPRA Paper 24834, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2004. "Does greater accountability improve the quality of delivery of public services? Evidence from Uganda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3277, The World Bank.
- Iwasaki, Ichiro & Suzuki, Taku, 2012.
"The determinants of corruption in transition economies,"
Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 54-60.
- Iwasaki, Ichiro & Suzuki, Taku, 2010. "The Determinants of Corruption in Transition Economies," Discussion Paper Series a533, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2005. "Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 171-191, January.
- Keefer, Philip, 2004. "A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3315, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.