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A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice

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Author Info
Keefer, Philip

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Abstract

Keefer reviews progress made in understanding the effects of different dimensions of governance on economic development, and the sources of good governance. The term governance has been used to embrace concepts that are heterogeneous both with respect to their effects on economic development and their genesis. Future progress in developing policy responses to bad governance will depend on separately examining these heterogeneous elements-the security of property rights, the quality of bureaucratic performance, corruption, voice, and accountability. Future progress will also depend on explicitly linking problems of governance to the overarching political environment and the incentives of governments to correct those problems.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3315.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3315

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Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Labor Policies; Banks&Banking Reform; Decentralization; Economic Theory&Research; Governance Indicators; NationalGovernance; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Banks&Banking Reform;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  10. Rodrik, Dani & Subramanian, Arvind & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 3643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Resnick, Danielle & Birner, Regina, 2006. "Does good governance contribute to pro-poor growth?: a review of the evidence from cross-country studies," DSGD discussion papers 30, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
  2. Raposo, Mario & Leitão, João & Paco, Arminda, 2006. "E-Governance of Universities: A Proposal of Benchmarking Methodology," MPRA Paper 484, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2005. "Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions," Working papers 2005-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Resnick, Danielle & Birner, Regina, 2005. "Does Good Governance Contribute to Pro-poor Growth?: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence from Cross-Country Studies," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 5, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. de Haan, Arjan & Everest-Phillips, Max, 2007. "Can New Aid Modalities Handle Politics?," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
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