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A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice

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  • Keefer, Philip

Abstract

Keefer reviews progress made in understanding the effects of different dimensions of governance on economic development, and the sources of good governance. The term governance has been used to embrace concepts that are heterogeneous both with respect to their effects on economic development and their genesis. Future progress in developing policy responses to bad governance will depend on separately examining these heterogeneous elements-the security of property rights, the quality of bureaucratic performance, corruption, voice, and accountability. Future progress will also depend on explicitly linking problems of governance to the overarching political environment and the incentives of governments to correct those problems.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3315.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3315

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Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Labor Policies; Banks&Banking Reform; Decentralization; Economic Theory&Research; Governance Indicators; NationalGovernance; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Banks&Banking Reform;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Haggard, Stephan & Tiede, Lydia, 2011. "The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 673-685, May.
  2. Mellati, Ali, 2008. "Uncertainty and investment in private sector: An analytical argument and a review of the economy of Iran," MPRA Paper 26655, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Sue, Eddie D.W. & Wong, Wei-Kang, 2010. "The political economy of housing prices: Hedonic pricing with regression discontinuity," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 133-144, June.
  4. Tulbure, Narcis & Catarama, Delia, 2009. "Institutional and Socio-Cultural Factors Explaining the Development of Mutual Funds. A Cross-Country Analysis," MPRA Paper 20341, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Christian Bjørnskov, 2010. "How does social trust lead to better governance? An attempt to separate electoral and bureaucratic mechanisms," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 323-346, July.
  6. Resnick, Danielle & Birner, Regina, 2006. "Does good governance contribute to pro-poor growth?: a review of the evidence from cross-country studies," DSGD discussion papers, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 30, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  7. Raposo, Mario & Leitão, João & Paco, Arminda, 2006. "E-Governance of Universities: A Proposal of Benchmarking Methodology," MPRA Paper 484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Bernardin Akitoby & Thomas Stratmann, 2010. "The value of institutions for financial markets: evidence from emerging markets," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, Springer, vol. 146(4), pages 781-797, December.
  9. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2005. "Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2005-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  10. Sebastián Fleitas & Andrés Rius & Carolina Román & Henry Willebald, 2013. "Contract enforcement, investment and growth in Uruguay since 1870," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 13-01, Instituto de Economía - IECON.

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