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Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions

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Mwangi S. Kimenyi (University of Connecticut)

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the link between economic rights and institutions. Simple analysis of data is used to demonstrate countries' human development effort in advancing economics rights of the citizens. A country's human development effort is evaluated on the basis of the well-being of the poorest members of the society. An analysis of data reveals that there is a wide variation in countries' pro-poor stance. While it is accepted that positive rights are pro-poor, this paper argues that so too are negative economic rights and in fact the two are complements rather than substitutes. Classifying countries into human development income deficit and human development effort deficit, it is demonstrated that a large number of countries could achieve higher welfare levels for the poor if they improved on bother positive and negative economic rights. The paper attempts to explain variations in the observed commitment to economic rights by focusing on pro-poor institutions. The basic thesis advanced in the paper is that pro-poor policies are more likely to be implemented and sustained in those institutions where power is sufficiently diffused such that even the poor have leverage over policy outcomes. The paper focuses on how institutions impact on power diffusion and therefore the adoption of pro-poor growth and policies. The failure of countries to adopt pro-poor growth and policies is attributed to institutional failures manifested in concentration of power. The policy recommendations emanating from the analysis focus on institutional reforms to enhance power diffusion. These policies include enlarging the political space through democratization, strengthening institutions and capacity to fight corruption and improve transparency, and bringing the government closer to the people through appropriate design and implementation of decentralization schemes. Some recent examples of improvements in economic rights following power diffusion are provided.

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Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2005-40.

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Length: 66 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-40

Note: Paper prepared for presentation at the Economics Rights Conference organized by the Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut, October 27-29, 2005. An earlier version of this paper entitled "Institutions of Governance, Power Diffusion and Pro-Poor Growth and Policies," was presented at a Senior Policy seminar organized by African Economic Research Consortium, March 22-24, 2005, Cape Town, South Africa. I am grateful to members of the Economic Rights Reading Group for helpful comments and suggestions.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - General
I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - General Welfare

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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2007. "Institutional Infrastructure to Support 'Super Growth' in Kenya: Governance Thresholds, Reversion Rates and Economic Development," Working papers 2007-32, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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